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Summary findings
On July 1, 1993, the European Union (EU)  adopted a  access  provide aid to preferred suppliers,  but cost EU
unified banana policy  that is even more distortionary and  consumers  dearly and the quota restrictions  hurt
cosdy than some of the disparate national policies it  nonpreferred suppliers (mainly  Latin American
replaced.  Before, some EU  countries gave preferred  countries). But the main problem  with the nev  policy  is
market access  and high prices to banana producers from  that it extends protection (and consequent ineffiencies)
selected  developing  countries in Africa, the Caribbean,  to countries where it didn't exist before .
and the Pacific,  and from EU  territorial suppliers.  This  As the costs of the new EU policy  become better
preferential  status was regarded as a form of aid to  understood, new forces are emerging  that will probably
countries with historical ties to certain EU countries  create pressure for change over the next decade. Banana
(France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).  Other  producers who now receive  aid through preferential
EU  countries (Belgium,  Denmark, Germany, Ireland,  access  to the EU banana marker are likely to lose rhose
Luxembourg,  and the Netherlands) granted no  preferences.  This could deal a hefry blow to several  small
preferences  and either had free trade policies or imposed  Caribbean island economies  and some African  countries.
only low tariffs.  But much more efficient  alterrative mechanisms  exist
The earlier quota-based national policies  were  through which the European Union  could grant aid to
inefficient  because  the main benefits  of the quotas and  rhese economies-
high prices were enjoyed by importers, wholesalers,  and  The European Union and the favored Caribbean
retailers in the quota-restricted countries. Under the  countries could all gain much by shifting from banana
unified EU policy, quotas, high prices, and preferential  aid to furmalized, targeted general development  aid.
This paper  -the  third 'bananaramae  paper and a joint product of the International Trade Division, International
Economics  Department,  and the Office  of the Chief Economist,  Latin America  and the Caribbean  Regional  Office-is  part
of a larger effort in the Bank to analyze  international commodity policies.  Copies of the paper are available  free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Grace Ilogon, room R2-072, extension 33732
(33 pages).  December 1994.
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developmnot  iues.  An objectiue  of the series  is toget the  findingsout  quickly, even if the presentations  are  lss  than  fadly  polise  The
papers  cony the names  of the  authors and should be usd and cited accordingly.  Th  flnding  interpreatons, and condlusions  are the
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New EU banana policy extends protection, favors
inefficient producers, and is a costly way to give aid. Pressures for
change could necessitate major adjustments in the smaller ACP
countries. A program of transition to foster economic
diversification is urgently needed in these countries.
by
Brent Borrell**
This work was jointly  funded by the Intemational  Trade Division, Internatioial  Economics
Department,  and the  Office of the Chief Economist  in the LAC region of tbe  World Bank
Bren Borrell is chief market economist  with the Centre for Intemnational  Economics,
Canbera, Austalia.Abstract
The new EU banana  policy  is highly  inefficient. As its costs become  better
understood,  many new politico-economic  forces are emerging  which are  ikely to cause the
policy  to be changed over the next decade. For banana  producers  who receive  aid through
preferential  access  to the EU banana  market,  the changes  are likely  to result  in eventual  loss of
preferences. This could deal a hefty  blow to several  small island  economies  of the Canrbean
and some African  countries. However,  alternative  much  more efficient  mechanisms  exist for
the EU to grant  aid to these  economies.  The  EU and the Caribbean  countries  involved  could  all
gain a great  deal  by formalising  and  targeting  aid  in place  of general  development  banana aid.Contents
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5.1 The downward  wend  in world banana  prices  .231  New  EU banana  policy is highly  protectionist:  introduction  and background
On July  1,  1993, the  European Union (EU) replaced individual member
countries' trade regimes  governing  imports of bananas with a unified EU banana policy. In
adopting  this policy  the European  Union  has made a step backward.  The new policy  is even
more  distortionary  and costly  than  some  of the disparate  national  policies  it replaces.
Traditionally  some EU countries  have given  preferential  market  access
Previously  some EU countries  gave preferred  market access and high prices to
banana producers from select developing countries (African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP)
countries)  and EU territorial  suppliers.  This preferential  status was regarded  as a form of aid to
these countries.  The preferences  had grown out of historical  ties of vanrous  EU member
countries  (Great Britain,  France,  Spain,  Italy and Portugal)  with banana supply  regions (Belize,
Jamaica, Suriname, Windward Islands, Somalia, Cameroon, Ivory  Coast,  Guadeloupe,
Martinique,  Madeira  and the Canary  Islands)  - see box 1.1.  Complex  and highly  distortionary
trade regimes based on quota restrictions  to imports from non-preferred  suppliers had been
developed  in vanrous  EC member countries  to protect the preferences offered to preferred
suppliers.  Other counties,  Germany,  Netherlands,  Belgium, Denmarkc  Luxembourg and
Ireland, provided virualy  no preferences  and operated  either free trade policies  or imposed
relatively  small  tariffs.
The findings  of two earlier "bananarama"  papers (Borrell and Yang 1990 and
1992) and Borrell and Cuthbertson (1991) were that while quotas, high prices and the
preferential  access given provided some aid to preferred suppliers (see box 1.1) of certain
developing  countries, they cost EU consumers  dearly and the quota restrictons hurt non-
preferred  suppliers  (mainly  Latin  American  counties) which  are also  developing  county banana
exporters. A mrajor  conclusion  of these studies was that the previous quota based national
policies  were highly inefficient  because the main advantage  of the quotas and high prices was
captured  by importers,  wholesalers  and retailers  in those  quota  restricted  countries.
The  new policy also  gives  preferences  and is even more  ineficient
The main problem with the new policy is that it extends across the entire
European Union  the most protectonist and costly  of the former natonal policies. It relies on
quotas to restrict supply  and raise inrnal  BU prices. Prohibitive  over-quota  tariffs make the
quota  effective. A tariff also  applies  to quotaimports.
In the main, the new policy  continues  to protect  the vested interests established
under  the earlier  policies. The monopoly  profits  of EU marketers  have been at least maintained
and possibly increased  - tradiftonal EU marketers of ACP frmit  have been given special
privileges  backed by a system of licenses  which  has allowed  them to take market shares from
traditional  marketers  of Latin  American  fuit  The protection  afforded  banana  producers  in EU
ternitories  has been  guaranteed. Preferential  access,  or aid, for ACP producers  (see box lIl) has
to some  extentbeen  retained. That said, it is not guaranteed  as securely;  the aid it confers  is less
specifically  targeted  and prices for ACP fruit  have fallen  since  July last year. This fall in price
1may reflect the lesser quality  of ACP fruit and afforded  to traditional  EU' marketers to now
import  Latin  American  fruit  under  privileged  licence  conditions.
The main  difference  arising  from the adoption  of the new policy  is that the costs
of the policy  are borne  by consumers  in all EU countries  rather  than  consumers  in only  some EU
countries. Consumers  who formerly  benefited  from mostly  open and competitive  marketing,
such as those in Germany,  now face closed and uncompetitive  conditions  with higher prices.
Moreover,  import  restricfions  applying  against  non-preferred  supplying  countries  (see box 1.1)
have been tightened.  This has imposed extra costs on efficient export suppliers in Latin
America.  Costs have also been imposed on companies  which traditionally  marketed  Latin
American  bananas  in the  relatively  open and  contestable  markets  of the European  Union,  such as
Germany  where  a third  of all EU bananas  were  consumed.  The restrictive  quota  and allocation  of
import licenses  have discriminated  strongly  against  these companies  by directly  reducing  the
overall  size of the market as well as transferring  some of their market shares  to traditional  EU
marketing  companies. Banana  marketing  in the European  Union  has become  more restrictive
and  considerably  less competitive.
The opportunity  for an efficient,  virtual  free trade  outcome  was missed
The European  Union  missed  an opportunity  to greatly  rationalize  and reduce  the
cost of its previously  distortionary  policies. Borrell  and Yang (1990 and 1992) and Borrell  and
Cuthbertson  (1991) estimated  that the efficiency  of providing  aid to preferred suppliers  could
have been increased greatly  by pursuing  virtually  free trade policies  and targeted direct aid.
Indeed,  in terms of the policies  open to it, the European  Union  appears  to have adopted one of
the most costly  and distortionary  options.
There  are strong  pressures  to change  the new  policy
Despite the  missed opportunity,  the new policy has unleashed some new
pressures  for change. For the rest of this century  these  pressures  are likely  to mount and lead  to
large  changes  in the world  banana  market. Such changes  could  greatly  alter  the welfare  of many
Central  American  countries  and some  African  countries.  Among  these countries  are the world's
most efficient  banana exporters  - Colombia,  Costa  Rica, Guatemala,  Honduras,  Panama,  and
Ecuador  - and  some  of the less efficient  and  protected  producers  - Belize,  Jamaica,  Suriname,
Windward  Islands, Somalia,  Cameroon  and Ivory Coast. This latter group of conmtries  (ACP
countries) has long been protected  by preferential  access to uncompetitive  markets of the
European  Union. Each of these countries  will  be affected  differenty. But all will need  to make
adjustments.
Foremost among the new pressures for change is the emergence of a  well
focused debate on the inefficiencies  of EU banana policy.  Groups with well articulated
arguments  are now pressing  for reforms  of the EU policy. Pressures  are being  exerted through
GAIT.  Other forums will also be used.  This debate could well eventually  culminate  in a
substantial  liberalization  of EU policy. Already  this process  has resulted  in a 17 January  1994
GAIT panel ridng caling upon the European  Union  to dismantle  the new policy.  This has
forced an EU compromise response which could result in a small increase in the quota and a
lowering  of the in-quota  tariff,  albeit  that some  Latin  American  countries  could  be drawn  into the
2EU web of distortionary  preferences. At this stage (June 1994),  the EU compromise  has not
been ratified  by the EU Council  and possible  legal actions  in Europe  and the United  States are
likely to delay or even overthrow  the compromise. Whatever  the eventual outcome, the
compromises,  blockages  and  positioning  all reflect  the  very strong  prenssures  for reform.
Another  pressure for change  will be the expiry of the ACP Lome agreement
under  which  the European  Union  agreed  to uphold  the ACP countries'  preferential  access. This
expires  in 2002.
Reform would bring big changes for some developing countries
Eventual liberalization  of tie  EU market would be good for the efficient
exporters of Latin America who would gain more market access and higher world prices.
However,  it would also threaten  the preferred  market  access and the aid that flows from that
access  to less efficient  ACP exporting  countries.
Whether  the EU market  is eventually  liberalized  or not, there  is another  pressure
for change  emerging. Access  preferences  and therefore  aid to ACP countries  under the new
policy  are not as directly  targeted  as before. This reduced  focus has raised doubts about the
reiability of access preferences  and the aid they convey  continuing  in the long term.  Even if
preferential  access  continues,  questions  about  the efficiency  of providing  aid by distorting  banana
prices are sure to be raised.
Whatever  the eventual  outcome  the implications  seem  to be much  the same. The
inefficiencies  of EU policy  need  to be better  and more  widely  known  to promote  awareness  and
debate  and to hasten  the move  to more sensible  EU policy. At the very  least there are complex
aid, development  and adjustment  problems  for ACP countries  which will need to be tackled.
There is also  considerable  uncertainty  about  what  will happen  which  has big implications  for the
macroeconomic  outlook  for many small island economies. What would help to reduce this
uncertainty  and help  in the development  of such  economies  is a known  timetable  for change  with
transparent  objectives  and rules, transition  arrangements  and economic  support for adjustment,
social  support  and  diversification.
This paper documents  how  changes  in EU policy  could  affect  banana  exporting
countries  and  draws  out the policy  implications  for these  countres.
3Box 1.1 Preferred  and non-preferred  suppliers  of EU banana  imporbs
Countryg  8  ging
Peawf  errd  npppies  special  prgferaer  No-prefarcd  supplim
Afrian, Cafibbean  and  Padfic  L-it.n  Amerca  or so-iled  'doHar'  ara
(ACP)  countrs  I  cuntrisfCents  uiiand  South  America
Belize  United Kingdom  Colombia
Jamaica  Urdted  lingdom  Cost. Rica
Suriname  Urdted Kingdom  Guatemanla
Windward  Islands  United Kingdom  Honduras
Somalia  Italy  Panama
Cameroon  Prance  Ecuador
Ivory  Coast  France  Brazii




Canary  -sands  Spain
a  Under  the  Low  Convendan  all  ACP  countres  have  duty  free ccess  to  pro ted  EU madkets.  Germany  Is
virtualy .free  market,  so  gives  no preference  to ACP  suppliers.
42  The EU asd the world  banana  market
The European Union is the world's  largest importer of bananas.  It  imports
around  40 per cent of world  trade. Bananas  are the most  traded  of all fruits.
Banana exports are important  sources of foreign exchange for many small
developing  economies,  a large number of which are small island economies. Latin America
exports  most of the world's bananas,  accounting  for almost  75 per cent of world exports (chart
2.1). ACP countries  and overseas  EU territories  account  for 15  per cent  of world exports  only.
Chart  2.1 Latin  America  dominates  banana  exports
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The pattems  of trade between banana exporters  and the EU have been long
established  (see chart 2.2) and  have  shown  only  minor  changes  since  the EU was established  in
1957. They have been tightly  defined  by import policies  and preferences  granted by separile
national  govermments,  notwithstanding  the EU's common  commercial  policy. It imports  from
African,  Canbbean and Latin-American  sources  but does not import  from big Asian countries
such  as the Philippines.
Efficiency  of export  suppliers  varies  widely
Latin American  exporters  are efficient,  low cost suppliers  with the potential  to
expand  output The ACP countnes  and the overseas  EU territories  are less efficient  than  Latin
American  suppliers  (see  chart  2.3).
Climate, topography and soils favor Latin American countries over ACP
countries  and EU ternitories.  The resul, productivity  in Latin  America  is up to double  that of
other producing  countries  and non-labor  production  costs afe less than half of those in other
countries.  Quality  in Latin  America  is more  reliable.
5Chart  2.2 11 Eurnow  Union  Is  the  mdn  irnporter  of  bananas
Datasoiwcdd  Bar*C 99)  FAO  (1).
Competitive  production  and marketing  arrangements  also favor Latin Amencan
counries  over ACP countries and EU trritories  in the productivity  stakes.  Competiive
conditions have  ;atacted  considerable investment in  productivity and quality improving
technology  and  inasructe  in Latin America Lack of competiive production  and marketing
arrangements  in the ACP countries  and EU territories have reduced incentives  for simiar
investment  and  technology  tansfer.
6Chart  2.3 Banana  producers  In  Laihi  Amoeia  are  nmuh  mr.  efficen  ftha
pg4|b  ap  'canW  -d  'op  tam
,-.-
The lower  productivity  of ACP coutres  and territories  means they are highly
dependent  on the spei  access and high prices  provided  by the EU market  to maintain  existing
levels of production.
EU policies have chaned but preferences  remain  for now
On I July 1993, as part of continued  EU commercial  inteion,  the EU unified
banan  policy  came  ito  effecL It replaced  the the  mam types of national  policies  which  had
applied in various EU countries.  These inchlded  the highly protectionist  quota policies  of
France, Great Brtain, Spain,  Portugal, Iy  and Gmece, the free market of Gemnany  and the
mildly  tariffled  market of the Netherlands,  Belgn,  Denmark,  Ireland,  and  Luxembourg.-
Because  of its great importne  as an importer,  EU policy  decisions  potentially
have  a large economic  effect  on the world  banana  market
The oldpolcS:  sepaae  nadionalpolcies  before  I July 1993
EU countries  opeating quota based poicies used import restictions to limit
supplies and raise prices  to consumer (see chart 2.4).  They  also allowed  for pant  of the high
consumer  prices to be chaneled back to selected  developing  countrieserritories  - prerrd
suppliers  - by gming  them Prefrential maket access to raise  producers'fob prices (chart  2.5).
Tne part of the high consumer  prices not passed  back to preferred  producers was capured by
EU marketers in the form of excess profits. The preferred  status and high prices received  by
preferred suppliers  was intended  as a form of aid to the select  counriesterritories.  For ACP
counties, these preferences  are recognized  under the 1986 Lom6 IV convention  (signed in
1989).
7Chart  2.4 EU  retotl  prices  are generalyl  well  above  those  of  the  United  States
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Under  a special  protocol  of the Treaty  of Rome, Germany  was permtted to increase  its quota  m
lne with domestic  demand. It therefore  did not restrict supply  and  mntained a virtually  free
market  It had the lowest retail  prices in the EU.  The German  pnce was higher than the US
price shown in  chart 2.4  because transport costs and  other non-traded inputs affecting
wholesaling  and retaling margms  are higher  due to the high  value  of the Deutscbmark.  Prices  in
tariff-only  countries  were higher  than in Germany  due to the 20 per cent  tarff on imports  levied
cif'.
The new single policy greatly imypedes  the functioning  of an efficient market
The new unified  EU polcy mantans  preference  to ACP countres and EU
territories. A system  of EU-wide  quotas  has been  implemented  to restrict  supplies  and  maintain
consuxner  prices at levels high enough  to broadly  maintain  beneffis  to select EU marketers,  EU
- - ~~~8territories  and in general terns to ACP producers. The way quotas are allocated  helps to
maintain  existing  preferences  in broad  terms in the immediate  future. The method  of allocation
determines how quota  rents (from consumers) are allocated to  producers and others in the
marketing  chain. Quotas  are allocated  through  the use of a licensing  system,  although  how the
quota rents are allocated depends on the nature of supply and demand as well.
Separate quotas apply either implicitly  or explicitly to  bananas from EU
tetories,  ACP producers  and other  suppliers  -mainly  the  -efficient  Latin  American  exporters.
Quotzs on EU territory  and ACP bananas  are set at levels equal to or higher than the highest
level of shipment  over  the past five years  (1.7 million)  and are non-transferable.  The quota on
Lain  American supplies (2 million  tons) is the residual quota and it is transferable. It is
determined  in order  to fix the end price;  it has been  set at about  6 per cent  below Latin  American
supplies  to the EU in 1992 according  to World Bank data, but could be further below 1992
levels based on adjusted  Eurostat data.  Moreover,  one third of the Latin American  quota is
allocated  to marketers  of territorial  and ACP bananas. As well as helping  to guarantee  quota
rents to traditionally  protected  EU marketers  of bananas,  this provision  directly  transfers  market
shares from traditional  marketers of Latin American  fruit to marketers of territorial  and ACP
fruit.
ACP and Latin American  quotas are explicit  and quantitative. EU territorial
quotas are implicit  Provision  exists for deficiency  payments or compensation  for loss of
producers'  incomes which might arise as a result of the change  to a single market. Because
compensation  applies  to a maximum  quantity  of  bananas  produced  (0.854  million  tons), in effect
EU territorial  producers are guaranteed  prices similar to what they received previously  for a
fixed  amount  of fiuit  Certainy  there  is no upper  limit  to EU territorial  supply  to the EU market
and no penalty  above  the limt, however  wihout compensation  under fte new single  policy  U
entails  that territorial  suppliers'  prices could  decline  compared  to before the single  policy  came
into force. Previously,  EU territorial  suppliers  received  prices  higher  than  the average. And so,
EU territorial  producers' guaranteed  price is limited  to a maximum  quantity. They,  may face
lower  effective  prices  above  the quota. This amounts  to an implicit  quota.
Allocation  of import quotas and licenses discriminates  strongly against those
involved  in the production and marketing  of Latin American-  fruit and any non-traditional
quantities  of ACP fruit. At the same  time  the arrangements  distinctly  favor  those involved  in the
marketing  of traditional  ACP and EU territorial  fruit. As well  as some  of the traditional  market
share of firms marketing  Latin American  fnrit being directly  transferred,  by EU sanction,  to
firms  who tradionally market  ACP and EU territorial  fruit,  the access for Latin  American  fnrit
has been reduced compared  to what it had been. No similar  reciprocal  arrangement  has been
enacted affecting  ACP and EU territorial  frit  One explanation  of these arrangements  is that
they are designed  to force  the margins  earned  on the imports  of Latin  American  frait to be used
to cross-subsidize  the imports  of expensive  ACP and EU territorial  fruit.
Just how the market  wil operatz  in the long term remains  unclear. The system
provides  room  for considerable  administrative  discretion.  A management  committee  on bananas
has been established  consisting  of representatives  of the member states whose votes wil  be
weighted.  The quota on Lati  Amencan bananas is subiect to annual review and wil  be
adjusted based on the opinion  of the committee  and, more importantly,  the approval of the
9Commission,  i  line with forecasts  of: performance  the previous  year in general;  EU territorial
and  ACP production trends; and  consumption  trends  in  the  EU.  Under  'exceptional
circumstances'  (undefined)  the quota  may  be adjusted  during  the year  as well.
Tariffs also apply and are imposed discdminatory. EU territory and ACP
producers  pay no tariff  on entry  of quota  bananas. Latin  American  producers  must pay a tariff of
green ECU1OO/ton  on quota bananas (to be reduced to ECU75/tonne  if the EU compromise
agreement with  Latin American  countrics is  ratified).  This  tariff is  equal  to  commercial
ECU121/ton.  A  prohibitive over-quota  tariff  applies:  green  ECU850/ton  (commercial
ECU1025/ton)  on Latin  American  fruit  and green  ECU 750/ton  on ACP fruiL This tariff  makes
the quota  binding.
The licensing system extends to  allocate preferences  to  prmary importers,
secondary  importers  and.  ripeners  through  a weighting  system..  This has the effect of allocating
quota rents according to the specified weightings among those involved in marketing bananas.
Licenses are allocated  based on a three year moving  average  and other discDminatory  rules.
These preferences  apply  only  to imports  from  Latin  America  and non-tradional quantiies.  from
ACP countries. No similar  or symmetrcal  set of allocative  preferences  apply  to importers  and
ripeners of traditional ACP and EU territorial  frit  which adds to the discriminatory  and
uncompetitive  nature  of the arrngements.
Under  the new regime  there are also schemes  to provide  specific  assistance  to
producers in EU terriories.  There is a minimum  imcome  support  scheme, a banana tree puIl
scheme  to assist  growers  out of banana  production  and  for five years,  assistance  to encourage  the
establishment  of producer organizadons  for the purposes  of marketing. Such assistance  further
extends  the privileges  avalable to EU based marketing  firns  and discriminates  against firms
marketing  Latin  American  fruiL  Regulations  to control  quality  and  standards  also apply.
Although  no specific  provisions  are made for assistance  to producers in ACP
countries  under the EU regulaons defining  the EU banana policy,  there exists a proposal  to
provide  direct  aid to improve  the quality  of ACP producers'  bananas,  linked  in with provisions
for marketing  and  vertical  integration  and temporary  compensation  for declning revenues  caused
by lower  prices. However  this proposal  has not been  ratfied by the EU council  and it is likely
that several of the member  states will oppose  the granting  of direct aid to ACP counties while
the existing  distortionary  policy  prevails.
In summary,  the new  unified  policy  gratly limits  the workings  of the market in
allocating  resources  associated  with the growing,  distributing,  handling  and selling of bananas.
A raft of mechanisms  exists  which  limit  competition,  restict trade and which  require  officials  far
removed  from the market  to make resource  allocation  decisions. The policy  is complicated  and
is designed  to allow  tightly  managed  trade.
10With lower prices demand would increase
The demand for bananas has grown strongly in recent years in many EU
countries. The discrepancy  between  banana  consumption  per person  in Germany  (14 kg a year
previously  with the lowest consumer  pnces) and consumption  in the United  Kingdom  (8 kg a
year)  suggests  that  the EU market for bananas  has the potential  to expand, However,  the prices
detennined  by the new  policy  will have  abig bearing  on this  (see  Borrell  and  Yang 1992).
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:3  How EU policy distorts world banana trade
Three earlier papers document  the large inefficiencies  of the previous  national
EU banana  policies  - Borrell  and Yang  (1990),  Borrell  and Cuthbertson  (1991) and Borrell  and
Yang (1992).  The economic  effects of the new policy  can be interpreted  from the results of
Borrell  and Yang (1992).  The economic  effects  of both the old and new policies  are presented
here. Presentation  of the  effects  of earlier  policies  provides  a point  of reference.
The previous  policies  were  extremely  inefficient
Borrell  and  Yang (1992)  found  that previous  EU policies  greatly  altered  imports,
exports,  prices and welfare  compared  to a free trade siuation. Using a world  trade modeL  they
found that the policies  caused  preferred  suppliers' exports  to be nearly  double  what they would
be under fiee trade, and caused  EU consumption,  the world price, the Latin American  export
price and other suppliers' exports to  all be lower (see chart 3.1).  The policies cost EU
consumers  about  $1.6 billion  annually  to transfer  a net benefit of $0.3 billion  a year  to preferred
suppliers  - EU territorial  and ACP producer  (see chart 3.2). This was an extremely  inefficient
transmission  of aid.  It cost EU consumers about $5.30 to transfer $1.00 of aid to select
developing  counties or regions. Addihtonally,  every  dollar of aid reaching  preferred  suppliers
cost other developing country suppliers  -the  Latin Americans - $0.32  or $98  million
annually  in total.
Chart 3.1 Ncoional  polcosl of EU  countre s unfluence  world banana  trade
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EU marketers  were the main beneficiares. Of the estiated  $5.30 it cost EU
consumers  to transfer  $1.00 of aid (or $1.6 biion  in total cost to EU consumers)  over $3.00 (or
$917 million  in total) was siphoned-off  as excessive  marketing  margins and transferred to
protected  importers  and wholesalers.  About  $0.30 was collected  as tariff  revenue. About  $1.90
(or $575 million  in total) was the net cost to the European  Union  after  allowing  for the excessive
margin  and tariff  transfers.  And about $1.00 (or $304 million  in total)  was lost in outright  waste
12to the world economy. Waste occurred  because more resources  were used up in producing
bananas  than was necessary. At least some  of the baas  produced  at high cost by preferred
suppliers  could  have  been produced  with  fewer  and  cheaper  resources  in the more efficient,  non-
preferred  suppliers  of Latin  America.
The incidence  of the costs and  benefits  of the policies  on various  countries  and
regions are summarized  in chart 3.2. Borrell  and Yang show that more efficient  policies  could
have  been  used to achieve  the EU's aid commitment.  Through  the use of a small  tariff of about
17 per cent  used to fund  a system  of well  targeted  deficiency  payments  or direct  aid, the costs  of
the policies  could  have been  virtually  eliminated  while  the aid benefits  could  have  been retained
or improved.  The inefficiency  of  transferring  aid could  have  been  reduced  enormously.  The cost
to EU consumers  of transferring  one dollar  of aid could have  been reduced  from $5.30 to just
over $1.00.
Read  (1994)  takes  issue  with  the Borrell  and Yang  estmates. He argues  that  the
estimates  of the cost of previous  policies  may  be overestimated.  He argues  Borrell  and Yang
have assumed  that a perfectly  competitive  market would  prevail if free market policies  were
adopted  in place of previous  national  policies. This he argues  is incore  and that the market
would  be an oligopoly. However,  Borrell  and Yang did not assumed  a perfecty competitive
market.  Simply they assumed that the market would be as contestable  and at  least as
competitive  as the German  market was and as the US market currently  is.  These are not
necessarily  perfecty competitive  markets,  but there is no reason  for believing  that an open EU
market  would be any less contestable  and open than  the German  market was or than the US
market  is.  Read (1994) rity  points  out that, if anything,  the German  market  prices assumed
by Borrell  and Yang  to prevail  in an open  EU market  underestimates  the price  falls  which  might
occur  in other  member  countries  because  of their  preferences  for lower  quality  bananas  than  the
Germans. If so, the Borrell  and Yang estimates  would  underestimate  the gains  from replacing
previously  distortionary  trade with open  trade. That  is, the cost of distortionary  policies  may  be
higher  than  estimated  by Borrell  and  Yang.
The new policy  is more costly  than tie old
Because  the new polcy restricts  aggregate  imports  of bananas  to the EU more
than the total of separate  national  policies,  the new policy  is more costly  than the old policies.
Chart 3.3 summarizes  the comparative  costs. The single  EU banana  price  is estimated  to be 12
per cent higher  than the weighted  average  of previous  separate  national  prices. This increase
allows  excessive  monopoly  profits  to marketers  to be higher  than previously. Aid to preferred
suppliers is likely  to be much the same in aggregate  though possibly different  to individual
supplying  regions. The cost to consumers  is estimated  to have shifted considerably  toward
Germany,  the Netherlands,  Belgim, Denmark  and Ireland  and away  from other  EU consuming
countries  and  has gone  up from  around  $1.6  billion  annually  to $2.3  billion.
Although  the EU Commission  appears  to be arguing  that under its tariff-qota
arrangements  over-quota  bananas  can and wil enter  the EU, the evidence  is that the over-quota
tariff  is clearly  prohibitive  (see  chart  34).  Based  an model  results  of Borrill and Yang,  with a 2
million  ton quota on Latin  American  frui, EU retafl  prices  wi  setle at around  US$2100/ton  or
ECU1809hton.  To sell over quota  fnuit,  retail  prices will have to fall below  this leveL But the
13over-quota  tariff will be set at commercil ECU1025/ton  which  will force up the price of over-
quota bananas to an estimated  ECU2332/ton  - see Borrell (1993).  This price is clearly  far
above  EU consumners'  willingness  to pay and  they  will switch  to other  fruit.
Chart 3.2 National  banana policies  of EU  countries  were  costly
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14Managing  the quotas and licenses  is already  proving  difficult  and will continue  to be so.  The
welfare  of many groups  involved  in supplying  bananas  will become  sensitive  to decisions  made
by the management  committee  on bananas. This will make the setting of quotas vulnerable  to
political  interference. Political  objectives  are likely  to override  commercial  ones.  Already  the
market  has been  made  uncompetitive.
The volume  of trade by fis  which  previously  marketed  Latin American  bananas
competitively  in the European  Union  has been reduced  by around  50 per cent since  the introduction
of the new  policy. This is due  to the restrictive  2.0 milion ton quota and  to discrininatory  nature  of
how quota and licensing  are allocated. The reduced trade of these firmus  has also reduced tleir
economies  of scale  and increased  their  costs.
Chart  3.3 The  new EU  policy  is  even more  costly  than  lhe nHtiond  polides I  repl=aces
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The new polcy  is a big step backwards
In  moving to  adopt a  new unified  policy the European Union missed an
opportnty  to rationalize and improve its distortionary banana policies.  Of options open to it,
the European,  Union chose one of the most discrimninatory  and distortionary.  There are two
possible explanations  for not choosing  simpler and much more efficient  policies.  One is to
Protect (anld  exPand)  the vested interests of EU based marketing  companies. This group is
clearly the main beneficres  of the polcy.  EU consumers, other markreters  and Latin American
suppliers  are clearly  big losers, If so, the main objective  of the policy  does not appear  to be to
provide aid to ACP and  EC ternitorial  producers. The ofthr possible  explanation  iss  that policy
makers  still do not fully  understand  the effects  of their  polce.Either  way, proper analysis  and
measurement  appears  to be essentiaL
For EU territorial suppliers the policy seems to offer assured protection, but for
ACP suppliers,  the policy  introduces  considerable  uncertaJinty  and confusion  about the level of
support they will recive.  Support is provided in a completely indirect way and is not well
targeted,  although  the proposal  to provide  additional  aid to assist in increasing  productivity  and.
quality in ACP countries may be an acknowledgment  by the European Union of a need for a
diffeent  form of aid.  But as it stands now, in part the provision of support relies on margins
coleted  on the sale of Latin Ameeian  fhuit  to ber  handed to ACP producers and in some cases  t
relies on one marketer earning the margin and then t  femrng  it to another before it is passed
on. The mechanism is by no means transparent and there is, as of yet, no specific commiment to
ACP suppliers as there is to EU territorial SUPPierS. The policy creates huge incentives for rent
1  6seeking and political  interference. And there are many grey areas about how quotas will be
adjusted  in the future, about  how import  licenses  will  be allocated  and about  how  marketers  may
use the powers  afforded  them under the legislation  to manipulate  supplies.  All this makes the
market  less predictable  than previously  and introduces  considerable,  and costly,  business risk.
And  for small  island  economies  it creates  considerable  uncertainty  for the entire  economy.
The new policy  limits  normal  commercial  operations  and competition. It does
not encourage  open, expansionary  practices,  efficiency,  innovation,  risk taking, quality and
consumer-oriented  marketing. The German  market  for instance  has gone from being an open,
rapidly  expanding,  contestable  market  with low consumer  prices to a closed one, with reduced
supplies, regulated  control over expansion  and higher consumer  prices.  The commitnent of
some marketers  in previously  contestable  EU markets  to expanding  the market by improving
efficiency  and qualiy has been greatly  impeded. Higher consumer  prices and restrictions  on
supply make this difficult. The growth  potential  of the EU market has probably  been greatly
restricted.
Indeed, the perverse incentives  and obvious inefficiencies  created under the
policy  may well turn out to be the seeds of its own destruction. When policies  are costly in
subtle hidden ways quite powerful analysis  is necessary  to drive the message home in a
persuasive  way.  But when policies  are so manifestly  bad public awareness  of the problems  is
more  or less automatically  generated.  Groups  adversely  affected  by the policy  will-have  a strong
incentive  to lobby against  its continuation  - already  there are many expensive  legal and other
resources  being devoted  (on both sides of the Adantic)  to lobbying  for reform of the policy.
Meanwhile,  there  is a real  possibility  that  increasingly  restrictive  regulations  and controls  may  be
introduced  to combat  the sorts of problems  which often  emerge  in tightly  managed,  closed and
uncompettive  markets.  But as more controls are put in place they will attract increasing
criticism  and opposition,  and eventually  public opinion  will force the policy  to be reformed.
Nonetheless,  the evolution  of an efficient  policy  and outcome  may  be higbly  unpredictable  and a
long  way  off.
174  Why the new EU policy  is unsustainable
The costs and inefficiencies  of EU banana policy have become increasingly
transparent  through  the process of formulating  a unified  policy. The process has spawned a
number  of studies  which  have  focused  attention  on the adverse  economic  and welfare  effects  of
the old and new regimes. It is now becoming  increasingly  transparent  to governments  in EU
states and the EU public  that the policy  is inconsistent  with many EU objectives  relating-  to
GATE, competition  law, aid to developing  countries,  increased  consumer  welfare, equity and
justice. Groups adversely  affected  by the policy  are now vigorously  pressing  for reforms  to the
policy.  Chief among them are the Latin American  producers,  marketers of Latin American
bananas  in  the  EU,  the- US  Government, various governments concerned about  the
implementation  of the Umguay Round and the governments  of Germany,  the Netherlands,
Belgium,  Denmark Luxembourg  and to a lesser  extent  Ireland,  and  Italy.
Many groups  are pressing  for reform:  Scenario  1-  liberalization
Through  GAIT, Latin American  countries  have exerted considerable  pressure
on the European  Union  to reform  its policy. And in January 1994, the GATE called for the
European  Union  to dismantle  its new policy. The panel  decision  has given  considerable  publicity
to the GATE  ilegality of the new policy. In response  the European  Union  is trying  to rafify  an
agreement with four Latin American countries  - Colombia,  Costa Rica, Venezuela and
Nicaragua  - not to pursue  the adoption  of the GAIT panel report  in exchange  for increases  in
the quota, a reduction of the in-quota tariff and additional  access and licensing  privileges.
However, although  the four Latin American  countries  have agreed to the compronise, at this
stage it has not been ratified  by the EU Council On both sides of the Atlantic  legal attempts  are
being made to delay and overturn  the compromise. And opposition  to -the  compromise  could
increase  by four when the EFTA  countries  accede  to the European  Union. So it is unclear  when
and whether  the compromise  will  be ratified  or, if it is, how  long it will last. Further,  several  of
the  Latin American suppliers (importantly,  Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Guatemala and
Mexico)  are insisting  that they  will continue  to fight  for a liberalized  market.  Further,  under new
dispute settlement  procedures  agreed under the Umguay GATE round, the consequences  of
GATT/WTO  panel findings  are likely  to be more difficult  to defy. At the very least the new
'consensus  to reject dispute panel reports instead of the old 'consensus to accept rule wil mean
good reports are guaranteed to be  adopted by the new WTO.  This will make it more
embarrassing  and make  the pressures  for compliance  more  enduring  for governments  who  try to
defy the findings.
Six actions  have been taken to the European  Court of Justice by marketers of
Latin  American  bananas  in the EU and one  by the German  Government  itself. They  have sought
to have the regulations  suspended on a number  of grounds  relating  to the discriminatory  and
disproportionate  nature  of the regime. Although  the court has dismissed  some of these actions,
others are still pending. The ruling on the German  Government  action  is expected  in October
1994.
The US Government's  interest  in the issues are many and varied. The United
States is no doubt concerned  about the economic  and political  stability of countries  in their
18region,  the trade policy  precedents  set by the banana  policy and what it considers  -to be the
discrimination  of EU policy against  American  banana  marketing  companies  operating  in the
European  Union. Although  US incentives  to see reform  of the EU policy  are clear  the means  for
achieving  that reform are not.  Nonetheless,  the US  Government  has the capability and
opportunities  to concentrate  on the policy  debate and is becoming  involved. It also has the
Section  301 provisions  in its trade legislation  to take action  against  unfair trading  practices  in
foreign  countries.
Other  governments  monitoring  the completion  and implementation  of the GATT
Uruguay Round are aware of the GATT dispute on bananas. They too can be expected  to
participate  in the debate  on EU banana  policy  and to point  it in the direction  of reform.
The groups  agitating  for change  of the EU policy  do so mainly  because  they  see
some potential  to bring  about  reform. With  so many  groups  vigorously  pursuing  this objective,
success is a realistic  possibility.  Liberalization  of the EU market should  be considered  as one
scenario.
Should it  occur, liberalization  would have obvious benefits for the  Latin
American  countries  but would  reduce  the size and profitability  of the bana  industries  of ACP
counties. Because  of the small  size of these  countries,  it could  also have  wider  macroeconomic
effects.
Scenario 2: muddling along
Without reform of the policy, rent seeking and political interference are ikely to
determine  how the market evolves.  The effects of this are difficult  to predict but withxout
informed  debate  the strongest  vested  interests  are likely  to prevaiL  The mechanisms  estabished
under the policy are especially  vulnerable  to political  interference  and the demands of strong
vested interests. Between  them, the Management  Cormnittee,  the Commission  and the Council
have great powers to change  the quota but this will be extremely  difficult  to do efficiently.
Bearing in mind the political strcture  and nature of the Committee, the Commission and the
Council  it is not hard  to imagine  political  targets  being  set  in place  of economic  ones.
Model results demonstrate  the difficulty  of managing the quota to  achieve
specific  economic  targets. A one  per cent  decrease  in the size of the Latin  American  quota  will
change  the cost of the program  by an estimated  ten per cent.  Small changes  in world supply
conditions  also have a large affect  on the cost of the program. By implication  small  changes  in
world supply  conditions  will require  large  changes  in quotas  to maintain  price targets  within  e
EC.  Quality  differences  in fmit from different  regions  wil also add  to the complexity  of setting
and  achieving  price targes (BorreilL  and  Yang 1992).
The reported results of Borrell and Yang demonstrate  that decisions  flowing
from the Management  Committee  on bananas will have the potential  to greatly affect the
livelihoods  of those involved  in supplying  bananas  to the EC.  For instance, a one per cent
reduction  in the quota  could  yield  preferred  producers  and  marketers  an estimated  additional  $50
miion  in excess profits. So there is a great deal of scope  and incentive  for rent seeking and
19black  marketeering.  These practices  increase  business  risk and costs and reduces  the consumer
orientation  of the market.
EU Comnmission  intervention  in the market discourages  legitimate  commercial
and competitive  market solutions to  many problems and establishes (or maintains) vested
interests.  With legitimate  commercial  channels  closed  off  in some  areas, market  participants  wif
turn to alternative  channels  - political,  black market  and  under-the-table  means  - to respond  to
changing  economic  pressures,  But altemative  channels  are not transparent  and open to all
participants. To operate through  them entails  taking of legal and personal  risks.  So the best
ideas  and practices  are less likely  to surface. Many  potential  participants  may have  too much at
stake  - an international  brand name  - to risk using illegitimate  commercial  avenues  to bring
about needed  change. If so, the best operators  may be discouraged  from thie  market.  What is
more, emphasis on protecting vested interests will detract from efforts to increase quality,
service  and economy;  the things  that enhance  the competitiveness  of the market. This weakens
the commercial  focus and user orientation  of the market. Efficiency  and predictability  of the
market  will suffer.
The long term economic  effects of quotas and how they are managed  are not
readily  apparent. The advantages  they  establish  for particular  groups  in the first instance  create
incentives  which distort economic  behavior over the long term.  Although this behavior is
difficult  to predict,  what does seem certain,  and is borne out by history,  is that through  time the
advantages  (preferences)  that quotas  provide  for various  groups  can be greatly  manipulated  and
be captured  by groups  other  than  those  for whom  they  were intended.
The possiblity of this scenario  raises the concern  that the quota rents arising
from preferences  established  under the policy  will be increasingly  captured by protected EU
marketers  at the expense  of EU territorial  producers  and ACP producers. Model results reveal
EU marketers are already by far the major recipients of the quota rents made possible due to
restictions  on competition.
At the same time, under this scenario the possibility  of developing  the full
potential  of the EU banana  market for the benefit of efficient  Latin  American  countries  will be
greatly  inhibited. Bananas  wil not be competitively  marketed  in the EU. Alternative  fruits will
be more  competitive.  Latin  American  supphers  will miss an important  growth  opportunity  in the
world's largest  banananmarket
An  additional politcal concern as to  why ACP producers may lose their
preferences  relates to the eventual  expiry of the ACP Lome agreement. This expires in 2002.
One  view of the EU Commission  is fhat development  and assistance  initiatives  for the Caribbean
should  be the responsibiity  of the United  States rather  than  the EU given  its proximity. The EU
long ago agreed  to honor its 1986 Lom6 IV banana commitments  in developing  its unified
banana  policy. In essence  it has largely done this, albeit inefficiently.  But these commitments
expire  in 2002. And it is instuctive to note  that  under the new policy  the EU has put in place a
guaranteed minimum income support scheme for territorial producers but  not for  ACP
producers.. This perhaps reflects its perception  of a lesser responsibility  toward the  ACP
producers. And the EU proposal  to provide additional  aid for research  into productivity  and
20quaiity  improvements  in the ACP  countries  may be a reflection  of an increasing  awareness  to
alter  the focus of how  aid  is given  to ACP  countries.
215  Coherent  policy  responses  for banana  exporters
Both efficient  Latin  American  and high cost Caribbean  banana  exporters  have
good reason to be disappointed  with the new EU banana policy. It introduces  considerable
uncertainties  into the production  and marketing  of bananas  and introduces  further confusion
about the aims to provide  aid to ACP producers. It reduces  the. competitiveness  of banana
marketing  in the European  Union  which  in the long term is iHkely  to reduce  the options  for all
banana  exporting  countries. Overall.it  reduces  access to the EU market and makes bananas  a
less competitive,  higher  priced  fruit  to EtT  consumers.  But above  aLll  the apparent  objectives  of
the policy  have little  to do with  the welfare  of banana  expordng  countries. The main objective
appears  to be to protect  and  expand  the monopoly  marketing  profits  of EU banana  marketeers.
Although  over the long-term  it seems inevitable  that the inefficiencies  of EU
banana  policy  will  be unsustainable,  it nonetheless  is likely  to cause much  dismption  and waste
in the interim.  .This  is a good  time  for both groups  of countries  to consider  their  positions  and  the
policy  responses  they  might  follow.
What  szems  important  is to reduce  the uncertainties  created  by the policy. What
would help to reduce  this uncertainty  and help in the development  of the ACP economies  at
least, is  a  known timetable of  change with transparent objectives and rules, tramnsition
arrangements  and economic  support  for adjustment,  social  support  and  diversification
Policy  considerations  for ACP  countries
The economic difficultes of small island states need special recognition.  The
Windward  islands,  for instance,  have become  dependent  on banana exports  for most of their
export earnings. Loss of that income  without  some form of compensation  or support would
impose great hardship. The social impacts of the ioss of income could be costly to ACP
countries.  Studies  of small  island  states  show  that  trade and  aid  often  represent  large  proportions
of their gross  national  product  (OECD  1989;  World  Bank  1989).
Many  small  island  states  are likely  to remain  dependent  on aid for a some  time to
come.  But how aid is delivered  will determine  the extent  of future reliance. Therefore  the
efficiency  with  which  that  aid  is transferred  is very  important.
Why a better  form of aidfor ACP counries is needed
The banana market with its  arfificially  high prices provides a  seemingly
convenient  mechanism  for the EU to transfer  economic  assistance  to small economies. But to
qualify  for the aid these small economies  must produce  bananas. They must therefore  use up
valuable  resources  - fertilizer,  pesticides,  shipping  space,  land,  labor and capital  - to obtain
the aid. The net value  of aid is therefore  substntially  below  the gross  value  because  the costs of
production  of preferred  suppliers  are  higher  than  the efficient  Latin  American  suppliers.
The 'aid' component  of the prices  paid to preferred  suppliers  for their bananas
encourages inefficient banana cultivation, maketing  and  discourages diversification  of
production. Without  pressure to be internationally  competitive  in production  and marketing,
22marketers  of ACP fruit  have not needed  to emphasize  the need for productivity  gains and new
technology  to the extent of competitive  marketers of bananas in the European Union.. In
competitive  exporting  countries  big productivity  gains have been achieved  through  technology
transfer  and highly  integrated  production  and rnarketing  systems. By some accounts,  the same
banana marketing  companies  operating  in both protected  and unprotected  markets have been
much more active in investing  in productivity  enhancing  techniology  in the unprotected  markets
than  in the protected  ones.
In as much  as the 'aid' component  of banana  prices  is captured  by landowners  in
the preferred  supplying  countries  the distnrbution  of  the aid  is inefficient  too. Far better  would  be
to use aid for infrastructure  development  that will assist in long term development  of efficient
industries  upon which  small  island  economies  can stage  their  own  development.
Further,  to the  extent  that aid is transferred  through  quota rents it is unreliable.
The aid is not transparent,  and it could  be captured  by others. So long as it is not delivered
direcdy  it cannot be guaranteed  or channelled  to most productive  uses.  When looldng  ahead
twenty  to thity years,  the futility  of protecting  inefficient  industries  seems  more apparent. Over
such a period, sometiing is bound to occur to jeopardize specific  product assistance  - as
occurred  with US sugar  aid.
Chart 5.1 reinforces  the eventual futility  of granting  aid through prices.  EU
national  policies  fix the prices to preferred  suppliers,  yet real banana prices have been on a
downward  trend.  As efficient  producers  become more efficient  in a competitive  market and
world  prices falL  EU and ACP producers  receiving  assured and higher rea prices become  less
compeiive and more dependent  on aid. They are under  lttle pressure  to adjust and resources
are increasingly  being  locked  into an industry  which  has no long  term  hope of being  competitive.
.~~~~~~I
Chchart  5.1 The  downward  tend in wolld baxnana  plices
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Currently  the ACP counties have a short term incentive  to increase banana
production  to ensure  they  have sufficient  quantities  to fill  their  quotas  in bad years. Failure  to fill
them may give  EU officials  reason  to realocate  the quota  Further,  the requirement  that 30 per
23cent of the Latin  American  quota  be given  to marketers  of EU and  ACP fruit  means some EU
and ACP fruit  could  substitute  for Latin  American  fruit. To establish  such  trade flows  EU and
ACP producers  need  more fruit. And  by implication,  Latin  American  producers  need  to grow
less.  However,  the more ACP producers  increase  production  the more vulnerable  they make
their  economies  to cuts  in preferences  if and  when  they  occur.
The EU proposal  to provide  ACP countries  with  aid aimed  at improving  quality
and productivity  and compensation  for declining  revenues  caused  by lower  prices,  if eventually
ratified  and successful,  may  also encourage  increases  in production  in ACP countries.  This type
of aid does  not  encourage  economic  diversification.
Asking  for dired aid in place of banana  aid is a sensdble  policy objectve  for ACP countries
EU banana policies currently  cost EU consumers  an estmated $2.3 billon
anmnally.  The policy  and its costs are  justified  in terms of the aid objective  being  pursued. One
intepretation of this siuation is that EU consumers  are wiling to part with $2.3 billion to
support  various  small island  economies.  But currently  only  $0.3 billion  of that wealth  reaches
these economies.  How much  weathier these  economies  could  be if more efficient  mechanisms
could  be used  to transfer  even  half  dte $2.3  billion.
Direct aid, instead of that ded to banana  prices, would  permit  this to happen.
The EU  proposal to  grant ACP countries aid for  quality, productivity  and  marketing
improvements  and  compensation  for loss of income  may  reflect  the growing  receptiveness  of the
EU toward  aernative forms of aid. Although  as stated  earlier,  several  of the member  states are
lIkely  to oppose  the graning of additional  or more  direct  forms of aid to ACP countries  until  the
existig distortionary  policy  are reformed,  and  the  type  of additional  aid proposed  still  locks  ACP
counties into banana production  to qualfy for aid.  Moreover,  to the extent that quality,
productvity and marketing problems  have a  lot to  do  with uncompetitive  simctures in
production  and  markting partly  sustained  by distortions  created  by EU polcy, the objectives  of
granting  this  type  of aid  may  be difficut to achieve.
It seems  that a major imnerative  of ACP countie  should  be to ask donors  to
decouple  aid  from banana  prices  and  formalze  the transfer  of aid. That  way  aid could  be used to
support  rational well  targeted  investments  which  help  support  economic  diversification.  Indeed,
such targetng and  focusng of direct  aid from  the European  Union  could  become  an imperative
of the development  programs  in these countrie.  And part of such programs could involve
making  approaches  to EU donors  to formai  direct  aid commitments.
A more  to direct  aid would  require  iniave  forstructural  adjustnent iACP  countries
A move  to direct  aid  would  result  in banana  prices  in ACP countries  dropping  to
world price levels.  Certainly  ACP prices have already sustained  some drop.  But at world
prices,  ACP prices  would  be about  half  of what  they  were before  the implementation  of the new
EU policy. It seems almost  incvitable  that this would  result  in reduced  production. However,
the extent  to which  this would  occur  would  differ  from country  to country  and would  depend  on
how  the real exchange  rate, wage  rates and  land  pnces change  as a result of no banana  aid, and
on  the potential  for  each  country  to achieve  productivity  gains.
24Decoupling  aid from banana prices may force ACP dountries  to seek more
competitive  production  and marketing  arrangements. This could provide  big incentives  for
technology  transfer  and adoption  of best practices  in marketing  and  growing. Productivity  gains
would follow. Nonetheless,  considerable  structural  adjustment,  economic  diversification  and
investment  in infrastructure  may  be required.
Specific  policy  initiatives  may  be required  to ensure productivity  gains can be
taken  up quicldy. Any  domestic  market  regulations  applying  to production  and  marketing  which
were designed to underpin preferential  access would need to be reviewed.  Laws which
previously  required  producers  to sell to a national  association  which  in turn made long-term
contracts  with  EU marketers  would  no longer  be required. Indeed  they  could  act as a hindrance
to better  production  and  more  competitive  marketing  arrangements.
A starting  point  for any specific  policy  initiative  to increase  productivity  should
be a detailed  study of marketing  arrangements  and infrastructure  needs. There may  be certain
infrastructure  requirements  - such  as better  port  facles  or roads  - which  is best provided  by
governments  and  direct  aid money  could  be used  for this  purpose.
in devising  policies  to improve  productivity,  it would seem-  sensible  to seek
means which would allow the most efficient  producers  and those with the most scope for
productivity  increases  to do so, but not to develop  poies  aimed  at increasing  producevity  for
all farmers.  The  EU's current  ACP quality,  productivity  and income  support  aid proposal  would
tend to create the possibilty of all producers  to increase  production. Even with productivity
gains, some diversification  into other  activities  wil be essential It may be necessary  for less
efficient  farmers  to move  out of the industry. To faciiate such a process,  direct  aid could  be
used to offer  farmers  assistance  to move  out, and  ifastructal  support  could  be given  to help
them diversify  into other  activities.  Direct  income  support  might  be considered  to facilitate  the
process  but there would  be many  problems. These  have  to do with  the adminisative costs of
arfanging  that support,  the incentives  provided  for people  to make  themselves  eligible  for it, and
the inequities  arising  in these countries  where  many  people  in other  sectors  may have suffered
even  greater  uncompensated  misfortmes. Therefore,  having  considered  income  support  with all
iis attendant  political  problems,  the best way of helping  adjustment  may be to introduce  the
policy  changes  in a clean and predictable  fashion  and to design  some  sort of social safety  net
without  a specific  income  guarantee. Once new acdvities  begin to develop,  the govemment
could  provide  infrastl  support  in the form of tansport facilities,  research,  extension,  and
intemational  marketing  information  and  expertise.
What  if the European Union  will not agree  to diect aid?
If the ACP quotas  were vested  direcdy  with  the ACP government  and could  be
filed with non-ACP  bananas,  they could effectively  be converted  to direct aid.  Non-ACP
bananas  purchased  at the world price could  be on-sold  into the EU market at high prices to
realize  big premims.  The premiums  would  be worth  more  than  current  aid because  the cost of
bananas  used to fill the quota  would  be cheaper  than  the value of resources  currently  used in
ACP countries  to fill those quotas. So costs of filling  the quota would  be less while  revenue
would  be unchanged.
25To achieve this outcome would require changing current EU  regulations
specifying  that the specific  ACP country  quota must be filled with fruit originating  in that
country. In effect the European  Union  would  have to.accept  the transferability  of the quota.
Although  this outcome  would  have  several  advantages  over  the current  situation,  changes  in EU
policy  toward  a more  liberal  market  in the fiuture  would  see premiums  and  therefore  aid to ACP
countries  diminish. In this regard direct aid not linked  to the banana  market at all would  be
superior. To convince  the European  Union  to undertake  such changes  would  require  a fornal
and  considered  approach.
Were the European  Union to accept a proposal  to make quotas transferable,
specific  policy  initiatives  would  still  be required  to facilitate  productivity  gains  in what remained
of smaller ACP industries  and to help some farmers adjust out of the industry into other
activities.
What  if the European Union  will  not accept  transferability?
Without  direct aid.  or transferability,  the ACP countries  face a dilemma. They
wish to maintain  production  to qualfy for banana  aid from the European  Union. At the same
time,  they  wish  to prepare  for the eventualy of losing  preferential  access. This implies  shifting
resources  out of banana  production  and  using some  of the aid resources  provided  by EU banana
policy  to finance  infrastucture  and new industry  development.  The only real solution  to this
dilemma  is to increase  productvity  in the banana  industry  and to attempt  to tax back some of
those  gains  to rallocate the aid resources  and  finance  other  developments.
Again an important  first step toward achieving  productivity  gains will be to
increase  compeion  in marketing  and to increasingly  expose  producers  to world market  price
conditions.  Various  policy  initiatives  could  be followed  to accomplsh  the objectives  identified
within  the constraints  ctyiined.
A study to identyfy  how  to open the  industries  to intenational  competition
A study examining  production  and marketing  regulations  should be a hi
pnority. The study  should  be aimed  at identfing  and  making  recommendations  to remove  any
barriers to iternational competition. Ensuring  the industies of ACP counuries  are open to
international  competition  in the marketing  of their  bananas  will  ensure  bidding  for ACP fuit is as
high as possible. Part of this will involve  ensuing no barriers  stand  in the way of foreign  direct
investment This could  be crucial  to aracting international  companies  to invest in the banana
industries  of these countries. Such foreign  direct  investment  has been important  in facilitating
important  technology  transfers which have enhanced  productivity  and development  in Latin
American  countries.
Ensurng flexiblity in marketing  and production  to promote integration  of the
production  and marketing  systems  is also  important  and any  study should  aim  to investigate  this
too.  Currently,  contracta  arngements  appear  to made in a way which  separates  producdon
and marketing.  This is a major difference  between  the marketing  of ACP and Latin  American
fuit  Yet integration  can be important  to ensure efficiency  in shipping  and-  to provide total
26quality  control. Integration  does not necessarily  require  vertical  integration  by ownership,  but
commercial  contractual  flexibility  needs to be adequate  to facilitate  a wide variety of business
arrangements  between  firms.
Expose  producers  to world  price by using  taxes:  variant  I
One possibility  for achieving  these objectives  is to make prices received by
banana  producers  subject  to an annually  larger  tax over a specified  period. The tax would  need
to be designed to absorb part or all of the productivity  gains achieved  but,  not to discourage
producers  from filling  the quota. This would  effectively  transfer  the 'rent' component  of high
banana  prices  from the European  Union  to the  particular  ACP goverment.
However, there are many problems with this approach.  Removal of EU
preferences  may cause the price to decline  to world prices before the specified  period and
determining  the rate of tax increases  would  require  great insights  about  what productivity  gains
are possible. Setting the tax too high would  mean not filling  the quota and setting  it too low
might  result  in over  filling  it and  having  to pay subsidizes  for over  production.
Put out marketing and policy management to competitive bids: variant 2
Another  variant  on how to achieve  a similar  outcome  to the above would  be to
invite international  banana marketing  companies  to put in competitive  bids to manage such a
marketing  and policy  program as outlined  in variant 1.  The objectives  would be to  maxim e
filling  of the quota and  to achieve  maximum  productivit gains  so as to maximize  the collection
of taxes. And the competitiveness  of each bid could  be assessed  in terms of these targets. A
fixed term  contract  could  be awarded  to the most competitive  bidder.
Such  an  approach would  encourage the  interational  banana marketing
companies  with the scope  for achieving  the greatest  productivity  gains  to bring  their know-how
to the ACP countries. The competitive  bidding  process  would  also force  each bidder  to identify
what policy, regulatory  or  other changes might be required to  improve the  efficiency  of
marketing  and production. The governments  of the ACP countries  could assess proposals  for
change  in terms of their political  acceptability  as wel as their competitiveness  as a bid. Indeed,
ACP governments  would be in a position to negotiate with the bidders to  iinlk politically
acceptable  solutions  if political  constraints  needed  to be taken  into account-
Still  this approach  centralizes  marketng and although  contracts  could  be put out
for competitive  tender periodically,  competition  in marketing  would  be limited  to the tendering
process.
Sel quotas  to the highest  bidder:  variant  3
Given the great uncertainty  about productivity  gains, setting the level of tax
incorrectly  and  the restrictiveness  of  appointng one  marketer,  selling  quotas  to the highest  bidder
wihin  the country would have several advantages.  Once sold, the buyer would have an
incentive  to fill the quota provided  it paid  to do so. If quotas  were made transferable  within  the
country (this would not concerm  the European  Union) a buyer who could not economically
27produce  to fill the quota would  have an incentive  to sell to someone  who could. At the same
time, upon initial sale of the quota the govenunent  would  collect  a tax based on producers'
collective  assessments  of the rent  component  in the banana  price. The tax would  be set  based on
capacity  of  the industry  to pay and  yet  still  continue  to fill quota.
If auctioned  off annually,  as productivity  gains occurred  competitive  bidding
would encourage  producers  to pay increasingly  higher prices (or taxes) for their quotas.  If
eventually  the European  Union  withdrew  preferences,  the price producers  would  be willing  to
pay  for quota  would  drop to zero. If the European  Union  does not withdraw  the preference,  the
ACP govemments  go on collecting  increasingly  higher  taxes  in line  with productivity  gains  until
such point as producers  become  competitive  at world prices  - which  is exactly  the position
aimed  for. And the ACP governments  would  go on capturing  the EU banana  aid which  can be
redirected  toward  broader  development.
Competitive  annual  auctions  of the quota  also give government  the incentive  to
create  a production  and marketing  environment  which  is conducive  to promoting  the uptake of
productivty gains.  This is because, the higher the productivity  gains, the higher is the price it
will  receive  for quota. The more  open  and  competitive  it makes  this environment  the more  likely
it is to attract  the most efficient  producers  and  marketers.
Although  fte above  may sound reasonably  straight  forward,  the auctioning  of
quotas  for export purposes  may be GATT  ilegal under  article  8.  More important,  government
annual on-going  intervention  in the market may become a major disincentive  to  efficient
producers and consumers  maidng a  long term commitment  to  productivity  increase and
investment  since  they  would  anticipate  the i ncreasi  taxes. On-going  government  intervention
also  makes  the industry  and  maket valnerable  to political  interferences  which  adds to business
AUocate  once  andfor all but make  quotasfWly  transferable  domestically:  variant  4
One way to  encourage  efficiency  but at the same time reduce government
involvement  in  the industry would be to simply make quotas freely transferable  among
producers. They would trade among  themselves  and more efficient  producers would have
incentives  to buy out less efficient  producers. The goverment would  not get to collect  a tax
directy from auctioning  the quota but to the extent  that efficiency  was improved,  producers
would increase  profits, a proportion  of which  they would plough back as investment  in the
economy  anyway,  and a proportion  of which  they  would  pay as income  tax.
In selling  their quotas  inefficient  growers  would  automarically  receive  a form of
compensation  for leaving  the mdustry. Inefficent  growers  would  only  face incentives  to sell if
the price recCved from sellng quotas made them better off than if they filled the  quota
themselves.  This way,  transferabiliy  would  provide  an automatic  safety  net against  hardship.
For many  ACP governments  this variant may be the most efficient  outcome.
Still, to maximize  productivity  gains, profits and taxes, the government  may have a special
responsibility  to ensure the production  and marketig environment  is as effcient as possible.
Also, creating  the expectation  among  producers  that preferences  may not be exteded beyond
28the current  Lome  convention  (beyond  2002)  may  also  be important.  This  way producers  will  be
encouraged  to at least  begin  thinking  about  how  to adjust  to lower  prices.
Consideration  should  be given to supporting  research
Under all variants research into banana production  and qualiy should be
undertaken,  possibly on a region-wide  basis.  This will support  banana production  in those
countries  where  it is economic.  As other  agricultural  activities  develop,  research  and extension
should  be undertaken  to support  the  new activities.  Initial  studies  could  be carried  out at an early
stage  to see which  agricultural  or other  activities  are likely  to develop.  However,  it is difficult  to
forecast  which  activities  will develop  under  different  real  exchange  rates.
Other infrastructural  support should also be underaken as  new activities
develop,  both on and  off the farm,  including  transport  and  marketing.
Policy  considerations  for Latin American exporters
Decoupling  aid from banana prices will improve  the trading environment  of
efficient  Latin American  exporters. Therefore  these countries  also face incentive  to try and
persuade the European  Union  to pay aid direcdy or allow transferability  of quotas.  Latin
American  countries  gain  most by seeing  distortions  to the world market  and reduced  access to
the EU market  elminated. It appears  that a major  policy  objective  for these countries  should  be
to coordine  and reinforce  their efforts  to fuel the debate  on reform  of EU policies. Further
development  of arguments  alenging EU policy  are important  for keeping  up pressure for
change. This  would  require  furhier  analysis,  measurement  and  debate  to help  inform  many  other
groups  indirectly  hurt  by EU policy.
The recent  EU attempts  to persuade  some  Latin  American  countries  to drop  their
GA,T action  against  the Union  in exchange  for larger  preferentil access  suggest  another  policy
priority  for this group of countries. They  need to closely  research  the long-term  problems  of
foregoing  competitive  trading  conditions  for the promise  of short-term  yet small concessions.
The fact that the European  Union  is wiling to compromise,  in response  to the GAIT panel
finding,  reflects  how sensitive  it is to GATE  actions  and the publicity  it creates. This helps
emphasize  the need  to keep  up pressures  on the European  Union  tbrough  GATT  as a means  of
stimllating  debate. And  the inefficiencies  in production  and marketing  in ACP countries  and
other  protected  agricultral  producers  around  the world  helps  to emphasize  the senous  long-term
problems which can arise by responding  to distorted  price signals and having to  allocate
preferential  access  using  quotas.
296  Where to next?
The cost and inefficiencies  of the new EU single banana policy are not in
dispute. They are large and extreme however they are measured. Furthermore, there are
indirect costs that are not measured  such as the uncertainty  created by the policy.  The fact
that the European Union chose to implement  such a distortionary  policy when faced with
the option of implementing  far more efficient  alternatives  is testimony  to the unpredictability
of policy making  in the European  Union. The obvious course of action was not followed.
What steps  the European  Union  will follow  next must also be regarded  as highly uncertain.
Some elements of political  interference  are predictable  and in this light the
EU banana policy may be seen as reinforcing the concern that  regionalism, political
inteiference  and the adoption of a common policy lead to lowest common denominator
solutions and an averaging  down of th,e  quality of policy. And although  we might predict
from this that the policy  is vulnerable  to being degraded  further, it tells us nothing of how
and only adds to the uncertainty  of when2.  But also it tells us nothing of the other vested
interests which may emerge.  That said, we can be sure there is plenty  of potential for new
groups to emerge as the costs and waste of the policy  becomes  better known, and that the
groups hurt by the policy  will press ever more strenuously  for reforming.  This is starting to
happen.  Indeed,  the enormity  of the inefficiencies  of the policy  and the wide range of groups
now positioning  themselves  for reforming  the policy  makes a strong case that inevitably  the
policy will be reformed. But again when remains highly  uncertain, and there could still be
plenty  of time for waste and disruption  to occur  in the interim.
The  uncertainty, waste  and  disruption imposed  on  bnan  exporting
countries while they wait for the European Union to rationalize its policy, represents a
polcy challenge  itself. For ACP producers who currently  receive  aid from preferential  (but
quota restricted) access to the high priced.EU banana market, the best policy response to
the uncertainty waste and disruption would appear to  be to  seek direct aid from the
European Union in place of that tied to banana prices. With direct aid more aid could be
received without making the European  Union any worse off and indeed it could be made
better off, that aid could be targeted to infrastrucure development  which would support
the development  of sustainable  industries  rather than an industry  which requires assistance
and adjustment  to the banana  industries  of these countries  could be made to put them on a
more sustainable  basis.
Of course, given  the unpredictability  of European  Union policy,  there can be
no  certainty of  the European Union accepting such a proposal despite the  economic
rationale  for doig  so. If the European  Union  will not agree to direct aid, were it to agree to
allow  import quotas to be tansferable between  countries,  with a little more effort, a similar
result to direct  aid could be achieved.
If the European  Union  will not accept transferability,  the ACP countries  face
the dilemma  of wishing  to maintain  production to qualify  for the aid, but at the same time
they must prepare for the eventual  loss of preferential  access.  In tiis  paper four variants to
achieving  these objectives  are outlined. The fourth is probably the simplest and cleanest
30alternative.  It involves  allocation  import  quotas of a particular  country among  its producers
and then allowing  those quota allocations  to be fully transferable  within  the country. This
should help encourage  the most efficient  producers to take up quota and for less efficient
producers to leave the induistry.  Fewer  resources  would then be used to produce bananas,
making the profits (and therefore the aid component)  from preferential  access greater for
the economy  of these countries.  Profitable  quota holders will pay taxes which can be used
for infrastructure  investment  and profitable  quotas holder will tend to invest some of their
profits  elsewhere  in the economy  anyway.
Under  all  four  variants proposed,  government may  have  a  special
responsibility  to ensure that the production and marketing  environment  is as efficient as
possible and  that  realistic expectations about  the  eventual loss  of  preferences are
established.  Preferences which insulate producers from market  -forces and international
competition often lessen the urgency  to  adopt international  best practices. This leads to
featherbedding  and technological  stagnation.  If government  can succeed in establishing  an
efficient commercial  environment,  this would increase the value of preferences to  the
economy  and increase the robustness of the industry for when it must face international
prices for bananas. Part of ensuring  a healthy commercial  environment  is established,  may
require  support  for policy,  marketing  and productivity  research
For Latin American  exports hurt by the policies,  direct aid in place of tied
banana aid to ACP countries  would  be to their advantage.  So, they  too have  an incentive  to
support ACP countries in any effort in this directiom  But Latin American  countries also
have an incentive  to keep up pressure on the European  Union to fundamentally  reform its
distortionary  policy. To this end, the Latin American  countries need to  keep up their
pressures  for reform  by making  transparent  the costs of the policy  and by forming  coalitions
of interest with other disaffected  groups. An emerging  concern  is that the European  Union
wi  keep  trying to  buy off  Latin American countries by also  offering them Emited
preferential access. In  this  regard the  Latin American countries should  familiarize
themselves  with the many long term problems  which have emerged  in ACP countries as a
result of preferences  and with protectionist,  quotas  based  policy elsewhere  in the world.
31Summary
In adopting  its new unified  banana  policy  the European  Union  chose  some  of the
worst features  of previous  EU member  countries'  policies.  The policy  essentially  maintains  the
trade access preferences  which some EU member countries  previously  granted to  banana
suppliers  in former  colonies  and  tenitories  as a fonn of aid.
Earlier  research  (Bananarama  I and II) has shown  that the previous  systems  of
preferences,  and  the import  quotas  used  to underpin  them,  were  highly  inefficient  as mechanisms
for granting  aid. They  cost EU consumers  dearly  while  providing  only  very small  advantages  to
banana suppliers in former  colonies and territorial  - mainly  ACP (African,  Caribbean  and
Pacific)  countries.  At the same  time the preferences  imposed  costs  on efficient  banana  exporting
countries  of Latin  America  which  are also developing  countries. The main beneficiaries  of the
policies  turned  out  to be marketers  of fiuit  coning from  countries  with preferences
The EU missed  a good opportity  to greatly  rationalize  and reduce  the cost of
its previously  distortionary  policies.  Earlier  research  indicates  that  the efficiency  of providing  aid
to preferred  suppliers  could  have  been increased  greatly  by pursuing  virtual  free trade policies
involving  a relatively  small  tariff  and  through  targeted,  diect aid.
The  new  polcy relies  on  EU-wide  quotas  to restict supply  and  raise  internal  EU
prices. Prohibitive  over-quota  tariffs make the quota  effective. A tariff also applies  to quota
imports.
The main  difference  arising  from  the adoption  of the new  policy  is that the costs
of the policy  are borne  by consumers  in all EU countries  rather  than  consumers  in only  some  EU
counties.  Moreover,  import restrictions  applying  against non-preferred  supplying  countries
have been tightened.  This has imposed extra costs on efficient  export suppliers in Latin
America.
Despite the opportumties  missed,  the new policy has unleashed some new
pressures  for change. Foremost  among  these  is the emergence  of a well  focused  debate  on the
inefficiencies  of  EU banana  policy.  Groups  with  well  articulated  arguments  are now  pressing  for
reforms  of the EU policy. Pressures  are being  exerted  through  GAIT.  Other  forums  will also
be used. This  debate  could  well  culminate  in a substantial  liberalization  of EU policy.
Whatever  the eventual  outcome  the new policy and the pressures  for change
create considerable  uncertainty  about what-  will happen.  This has big implications  for the
macroeconomic  outlook  for many  small  island  economies.  Loss of the aid without  compensation
could  have  a big economic  and  social  impact  on ACP countries.  What  would  help  to reduce  this
uncertainty  and  help  in the development  of such  economies  is a known  dmetable  for change  with
transparent  objectives  and rules,  transition  arrangements  and economic  support  for adjustment,
social  support  and  diversification.
This  paper  builds  on the previous  Banarama  papers  and documents  how changes
in EU policy  could  affect  banana  exporting  countries  and draws out the policy  implications  for
these countries. One of the main policy  implications  drawn out here is that ACP countries
32should ask for direct aid in place of banana aid.  This would allow for economic diversification
and  infrastructure  development, which  would  give  much  more  flexibility to  develop  the
economies of the ACP countries than restrictive  banana aid does.
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